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EFTA’s	model	of	compliance	would	struggle	to
accommodate	the	UK
Would	the	Norway	model	mean	the	UK	was	subject	to	the	rulings	of	a	foreign	court?	Morten
Kinander	(Norwegian	Business	School)	responds	to	Øyvind	Bø’s	recent	post	for	LSE	Brexit.
Yes,	EFTA	states	are	subject	to	the	decisions	of	their	Surveillance	Authorities,	but	they	are	not
formally	bound	by	them	in	the	sense	that	the	state	is	subject	to	sanctions.	This	is	an	important
distinction	because	it	shows	why	the	EFTA	system	is	able	to	accommodate	the	sovereignty	of	its
members.	Yet	EFTA	was	not	designed	for	an	ever	more	powerful	supervisory	structure,	and	it
would	struggle	to	incorporate	the	UK.	This	presents	a	welcome	opportunity	to	refurbish	the	whole
EFTA-pillar.
Judge	Øyvind	Bø’s	competent	response	to	my	piece	about	Brexit,	financial	markets,	and	the	Norwegian	model
seems	to	express	relative	agreement	with	my	main	point:	that	the	UK	has	little	hope	of	bargaining	its	way	into
passporting	rights	and	special	deals.	Gaining	access	to	the	EU	financial	markets	is	a	question	of	fitting	into	a
supervisory	system	that	has	evolved	into	a	semi-constitutional	structure,	with	necessary	supranational	elements.	In
such	a	system,	special	exceptions	make	little	sense.
He	has,	however,	two	issues	with	my	article,	one	concerning	the	EFTA	Court	and	the	other	concerning	the	EFTA
Surveillance	Authority.
Aalesund,	Norway.	Photo:	Les	Haines	via	a	CC	BY	2.0	licence
Concerning	the	EFTA	Court’s	and	the	binding	effect	on	Norwegian	law,	Bø	is	right	to	point	out	that	I	may	have
underplayed	the	function	of	the	EFTA	Court’s	decisions	in	Norwegian	law.	Decisions	that	are	not	merely	advisory
according	to	the	Article	34	of	the	Surveillance	and	Court	Agreement	(SCA)	(which	make	up	the	majority	of	the
decisions),	are	binding	in	the	sense	that	the	EFTA	States	are	required	to	take	all	“necessary	measures”	in	complying
with	the	judgments	of	the	Court,	cf	SCA	Art	33.	However,	the	Court	itself	lacks	sanctioning	capacity,	and	compliance
is	more	a	question	of	political	choice	than	a	legal	obligation.	Yes,	the	EFTA	Court	has	in	one	sense	binding	effect	in
Norway,	but	surely,	from	a	sovereignty	perspective,	being	subject	to	the	EFTA	Court	is	a	far	cry	from	being	subjected
to	the	CJEU,	even	though	the	EFTA	Court	is	set	up	to	imitate	the	CJEU.
Concerning	the	EFTA	Surveillance	Authority,	Bø	claims	that	the	EU	ESAs’	opinions	are	essentially	binding.	As	he
says:
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“Annex	IX	to	the	EEA	Agreement	states	that	whenever	the	ESAs	issue	draft	decisions	to	the	EFTA
Surveillance	Authority,	the	latter	‘shall,	without	undue	delay’	adopt	the	relevant	decision.	The	wording
clearly	suggests	that	the	EFTA	Surveillance	Authority	is	under	a	legal	duty	to	adopt	a	decision	whenever
the	ESAs	issue	a	draft.	Arguably,	the	role	of	the	EFTA	Surveillance	Authority	is	to	adapt	the	draft,	which
has	been	drafted	within	the	framework	of	the	EU,	to	the	framework	of	the	EEA	Agreement,	and	not	to
reconsider	the	underlying	substance	of	the	decision.”
The	crucial	point	here	is	the	phrase	“under	a	legal	duty”,	which	reveals	a	disagreement	between	Bø	and	myself:	The
claim	that	the	EFTA	Surveillance	Authority	is	legally	obligated	to	make	certain	decisions	overlooks	the	centrality	of
the	formal	aspect	in	making	the	whole	structure	work	from	a	sovereignty	perspective.	As	the	Norwegian	Ministry	of
Finance	said	when	presenting	the	arrangement:	“EFTA’s	Surveillance	Authority	will,	however,	have	no	legal	or	in	any
way	formal	duty	to	make	a	decision	with	a	certain	specific	content	when	a	draft	has	been	received”	(Prop	100	S
(2015-2016),	p.	14,	emphasis	mine).	Obviously,	if	the	EFTA	Surveillance	Authority	or	any	of	the	EFTA	States	do	not
make	a	corresponding	decision,	the	whole	structure	will	likely	fall	apart,	and	with	it	potentially	the	EEA	Agreement.
So	yes,	in	a	sense	the	EEA	EFTA	States	are	bound	by	decisions	of	the	ESAs,	but	this	binding	is	a	political	and	not	a
legal	one,	although	the	distinction	is	formal	to	the	point	of	absurdity.
My	main	point,	however,	is	that	this	hyper-formality	performs	a	central	task:	The	EEA	EFTA	States	are	not	formally
bound	by	the	EU	ESAs	(and	at	least	not	by	the	CJEU)	and	as	they	get	to	influence	the	rules	to	a	far	greater	extent
than	is	the	case	for	non-EEA	EFTA	States.	That	formality	achieves,	in	other	words,	the	crucial	“selling	case”	of	the
structure,	and	provides	a	model	of	less	subjection,	although	not	as	little	when	viewed	from	a	purely	formal
perspective.
In	a	broader	sense	this	precarious	structure	simultaneously	presents	an	opportunity	to	rebuild	the	system,	since	it	is
far	from	ready	to	include	an	independent-minded	and	sophisticated	player	such	as	the	UK.	For	example,	as	was	(part
of)	my	point;	non-compliance	does	not	carry	a	legal	stick,	as	compliance	turns	on	political	risk	of	disagreement	in	the
Joint	EEA	Committee,	where	the	EU	has	the	heaviest	hand.	In	other	words,	the	decisions	of	the	EFTA	Court	have
such	a	high	degree	of	compliance	in	the	EEA	EFTA	States	due	to	the	politically	asymmetric	status	of	the	current	EEA
EFTA	States.
Underlying	this	is	the	fact	that	the	whole	system	was	not	designed	for	its	current	modus	operandi	with	a
supranational	and	ever	more	powerful	supervisory	structure,	making	decisions	directly	applicable	in	the	Member
States.	The	EU	pillar	seems	to	manage	this,	as	the	much-needed	powers	and	regulations	drafted	by	the	EU	ESAs
are	formally	enacted	by	the	Commission	–	thus	complying	with	the	conditions	of	delegation	according	to	the	Meroni-
doctrine,	with	the	CJEU	being	a	true	court	of	justice	at	the	apex.	The	EFTA	pillar,	on	the	other	hand,	and	along	with
it,	the	EFTA	Court,	is	not	designed	to	carry	this	weight,	especially	with	an	ever	more	powerful	supervisory	system
that	depends	upon	direct	effect	in	the	national	markets.
The	fact	that	the	system	is	unfit	for	the	direct	and	unchanged	inclusion	of	a	player	like	the	UK	gives	Britain	an
opportunity	to	focus	on	remodelling	the	two-pillar	structure	according	to	its	own	preferences.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Morten	Kinander	is	Professor,	dr.juris	at	the	Norwegian	Business	School,	BI,	and	Director	of	the	Center	for	Financial
Regulation.
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